The three largest countries of this rapidly expanding organization have accelerated their drive toward closer and more comprehensive economic, political and strategic cooperation.

The ongoing consultations show their concern that vast areas of mutual relations are inadequately covered, and that their policy coordination mechanisms should be more actively used in an unfolding multipolar world.

One can take this as an attempt to create a more structured response to changing trade and investment flows along the new global security fault lines.

It is, therefore, no surprise that China and Russia wish to expand and upgrade their work on bilateral and world affairs. India is now joining them after a recent warming of relations with China.

Those who think that they can disrupt what increasingly looks as a de facto China-Russia alliance, ignore or, more likely, don’t know the history of an institutionalized cooperation since the middle of 1990s.

Russia and India need more trade with China

Understanding their position and the future developments in the global community, the two countries created in 1996 the Shanghai Five with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Convinced of the need for such a regional forum, Moscow and Beijing proceeded in June 2001 to include Uzbekistan and launch the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to promote deeper political, economic and security relations.

The SCO was subsequently expanded to ten member countries to include India and Pakistan (in 2017), Iran (in 2023) and Belarus (in 2024). Also, the SCO currently has two observer states and 14 dialogue partners.

The problem is that this large organizational infrastructure lacks internal cohesion and financial means for a meaningful regional activity and global positioning. And that is what Moscow and Beijing wish to fix through coordinated efforts to maintain and enhance stability and economic development in Central Asia.

Russia and China are also expanding their trade, investment, security and cultural ties as a foundation for joint action to support the Global South and the world’s multipolarity.

Their bilateral trade is growing despite serious obstacles posed by U.S. and E.U. sanctions. In the first 11 months of this year, the Russia-China trade increased 3.1%, with China’s sales to Russia marking an annual gain of 4.9% and Russian exports to Chine rising 1.5%.

Russia is among China’s ten largest trade partners, but its share of China trade is less than half of U.S. trade with China, and about a third of E.U.’s business with China.

India is also a relatively minor trade partner for China; its total China business is about one half of the China-Russia trade. The major difference compared with Russia is that India has a substantial trade deficit with China on falling exports and a 4% growth of imports from China.

China can avoid trade war with U.S. and E.U.

Those trade numbers are showing that there is a long way to go to translate the objective of closer political partnership into large, balanced and growing economic relations among the three leading BRICS countries.

And yet, that is what China, Russia and India need to build a political platform to compete with the U.S. and E.U. in world trade, finance and security systems.

China, the informal leader of that group, wants good working relations with U.S. and the E.U. who contributed one-third of its $3.2 trillion in export revenues during the first 11 months of this year. But that does not mean that China cannot do more toward a better-balanced trade with Russia, India and perhaps also with the rest of the BRICS ten member countries.

Discussions along those lines will continue as China moves to reduce its dependence on exports by deploying a growth strategy based on market opening and a stronger domestic demand.

Such a policy change in China is already under way partly because of import tariffs in the E.U. and similar -- probably broader – trade limitations announced by the new U.S. administration.

And it looks like China could win that game. The U.S. business community is unlikely to agree to de-risking – in fact decoupling – with China. Just losing access to China’s aviation market, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that the aviation manufacturing industry could lose up to $50 billion in annual output and 225,000 jobs.

The situation is even worse in the E.U. Germany, with the future of chemical and automobile industries staked on Chinese markets, will never allow Brussel’s trade wars with China.

It is, therefore, quite possible that China could avoid major foreign trade problems while continuing to lead the process of closer economic and political relations with Russia, India and a broader Global South community.