A good preview of next week’s U.S.-China summit in Beijing (May 14-15, 2026) is a discussion China’s Premier Li Quiang had on May 7, 2026, with visiting American senators, led by Steve Daines, a Republican from Montana.

According to China’s official media, Premier Li told the American delegation that the two governments should be implementing the consensus agreed by heads of state last February.

China considers that as a strategic guideline of bilateral relations based on “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.” In China’s view, that is much better than “confrontation and zero-sum competition.”

The Chinese official also reminded his visitors that the “Taiwan question” was “the first and foremost red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations.” He invited the U.S. Congress to “handle China-related issues with caution, and play an active role in the stable, sound and sustainable development of China-U.S. relations.”

That readout did not provide the response of American lawmakers, but the U.S. policy toward China is clearly spelled out in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November 2025 (pp. 19-24).

Arms race of nuclear armed adversaries

Washington’s emphasis is on deterrence and on American economic and technological advances to prevent war with China and maintain peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific area.

The U.S. wants to do all that with its main regional allies – Japan, South Korea and Australia. They are expected to share the burden of increasing military capabilities to secure freedom of air and sea navigation. That particularly refers to the South China Sea which handles one-third of global shipping.

All that, however, is a direct challenge to China’s maritime borders. Beijing takes that as an attack on its sovereignty and territorial integrity and does not recognize international arbitration that considers China’s claims unacceptable. Borders traced out by China’s nine-dash lines also involve long-standing territorial disputes with Japan and the Philippines – treaty allies the U.S. is bound to defend in case of military clashes with China.

And then there is the status of Taiwan; a critically important issue because, for Beijing, the self-governed island is a province of China, part of its internal affairs and off limits for any foreign interference. In view of that, China opposes any direct relations between Washington and Taipei and considers U.S. arms sales to Taiwan a gross violation of its sovereignty.

It follows, then, that, for China, the U.S. opposition to any unilateral change of Taiwan’s current status is a matter where Washington has no right to intervene.

The U.S., however, maintains its “longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan,” and will not “support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”

A soft decoupling?

Hence, Washington says, “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving a military overmatch, is a priority.”

That obviously means that the U.S. and China will escalate an ongoing arms race. Taiwan is the main flashpoint, but Middle East and South America are also areas of increasing conflicts involving enormous economic interests.

Middle East is one of China’s main energy suppliers and its rapidly growing export market.

South America is the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” which states that the U.S. will strengthen its “appeal as the Hemisphere’s economic and security partner of choice.”

The U.S.-China trade is another battleground where Beijing continues to hedge its risks. Last year, the bilateral trade declined 29 percent as China’s exports to the U.S. fell 26 percent and U.S. sales to China contracted 30 percent. The outcome was a 32 percent decline of U.S. trade deficit with China.

That declining trend in U.S.-China trade has accelerated at the beginning of this year.

In the first three months of 2026, the U.S. trade deficit with China was cut 53 percent from the year earlier, with Chinese exports to the U.S. declining 41 percent and U.S. sales to China shrinking 29 percent. The total bilateral trade fell 38 percent.

The falling American trade deficit is what U.S. wanted, but Washington still may wish to point out that this trade adjustment was proceeding at the expense of American exports to China. They are stuck at one-third of China’s sales to the U.S. So, either China buys much more from the U.S. or cuts much more its sales on U.S. markets.

Washington could force that issue by looking more carefully at sharply rising Mexican and Vietnamese trade surpluses with the U.S. for possible Chinese transshipment operations.

Another point to make is that China should recycle its surpluses on U.S. trades by buying more Treasury paper. Last year, China made a net income of $202.1 billion on U.S. trades but sold nearly $100 billion of U.S. Treasury securities. Washington could perhaps repeat an old warning to Japan: If you don’t buy, you won’t sell.

The U.S. and China need a thorough review of their relations. The U.S. concept of strategic competition is an adversarial posture and a world apart from China’s call for win-win cooperation. An apparent Washington-Beijing “consensus” to keep talking is a crisis management on a permanent collision course. American dealmakers should do better.